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ABSTRACT
The participating approach predicts whether a tweet, which
is accompanied by multimedia content (image/video), is trust-
worthy (real) or deceptive (fake). We combine two differ-
ent methods a) one using a semi-supervised learning scheme
that leverages the decisions of two independent classifiers to
produce a decision and b) one using textual patterns to ex-
tract claims about whether a post is fake or real and attribu-
tion statements about the content source. The experiments,
carried out on the Verifying Multimedia Use dataset, used
different combinations of content quality and trust-oriented
features, namely tweet-based, user-based and forensics.
1. INTRODUCTION
After high-impact events, large amounts of unverified in-
formation usually start spreading in social media. Often,
misleading information is getting viral affecting public opin-
ion and sentiment [4]. Based on this problem, the Verifying
Multimedia Use task highlights the need for verification and
addresses the challenging problem of establishing automated
approaches to classify social media posts as containing mis-
leading (fake) or trustworthy (real) content [2].
To tackle this challenge, we present a method combining
two approaches. The first approach is an extension of [3]
which introduces an agreement-retraining method that uses
part of its own predictions as new training samples with
the goal of adapting to posts from a new event (method
ARM). The second approach uses textual patterns to extract
claims about whether a post is fake or real and attribution
statements about the source of the content [7] (method ATT).
The conducted experiments use various sets of features.
2. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
2.1 ARM: Agreement-based Retraining
Being an extension of [3], the proposed method uses an
agreement-based retraining step with the aim to adapt to
posts from new events and improve the prediction accuracy
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Figure 1: Overview of agreement-based retraining.
on them. This is motivated by a similar approach imple-
mented in [8] (for the problem of polarity classification).
Figure 1 illustrates the adopted process. In step (a), us-
ing the training set, we build two independent classifiers
CL1, CL2 and we combine their predictions for the test set.
We compare the two predictions, and depending on their
agreement, we divide the test set into agreed and disagreed
subsets, which are treated differently by the classification
framework. Assuming that the agreed predictions are cor-
rect with high likelihood, we use them as training samples
along with our initial training set to build a new model for
classifying the disagreed samples. To this end, in step (b),
we add the agreed samples to the best performing of the
two initial models, CL1, CL2 (comparing them on the ba-
sis of their performance when doing cross-validation on the
training set). The goal of this method is to make the model
adaptable to specific characteristics of a new event.
The classifiers are built using three types of features: a)
tweet-based (TB), which use the post’s metadata, b) user-
based (UB), which use the user’s metadata, c) multimedia
forensics features (FOR), which are computed for the image
that accompanies the post. Except for the ones shared by
the task, we extract and use additional ones on each set.
TB: Binary features such as the presence of a word, symbol
or external link are added to the list. We also use language-
specific binary features that correspond to the presence of
specific terms; for languages, in which we cannot manage
to define such terms, we consider these values as missing.
We perform language detection with a publicly available li-
brary1. We add a feature for the number of slang words
in a text, using slang lists in English2 and Spanish3. For
the number of nouns, we use the Stanford parser4 to assign
parts of speech to each word (supported only in English)
and for text readability, the Flesch Reading Ease method5,
which computes the complexity of a piece of text as a score
in the interval (0: hard-to-read, 100: easy-to-read).
UB: We extract user-specific features such as the number of
media items, the account age and others that summarize
information shared by the user. For example, we check
whether the user shares a location and whether this can
be matched to a city name from the Geonames dataset6.
For both TB and UB features, we adopt trust-oriented fea-
tures for the links shared, through the post itself (TB) or
the user profile (UB). The WOT metric7 is a score indicat-
ing how trustworthy a website is, using reputation ratings
by Web users. We also include the in-degree and harmonic
centralities, rankings computed based on the links of the
web forming a graph8. Trust analysis of the links is also
performed using Web metrics provided by the Alexa API.
FOR: Following the method in [1], forensics features are ex-
tracted as descriptive statistics (maximum, minimum, mean,
median, most frequent value, standard deviation, and vari-
ance) computed from the BAG values. In this work, we also
extracted an additional feature that can measure the im-
age quality as a single score (from 0 to 100) by exploiting
the method in [6]. The forensics features extraction step is
performed as follows: for each image, a binary map is cre-
ated by thresholding the AJPG map, then the largest region
is considered as object and the rest as the background. For
both regions, seven descriptive statistics are computed from
the BAG values and concatenated to have a 14-dimensional
vector. The same process is applied on the NAJPG map. In
order to measure the image quality, discrete cosine transfor-
mation (DCT) is applied on the whole image, then a support
vector machine is applied to predict the quality based on the
values of the spectral and spatial entropies (computed from
the block DCT coefficients). In the end, all the forensics fea-
tures are concatenated as a 29-dimensional vector (14 from
AJPG, 14 from NAJPG, and 1 from image quality).
2.2 ATT: Attribution based claim extraction
This approach is motivated by the human verification pro-
cess employed by journalists, where attributed sources are
key to trustworthiness of claims. A classic natural language
processing pipeline is employed, involving text tokenization,
Parts of Speech (POS) tagging9 and a permissive named
entity recognition pattern focussing on noun phrases. A
number of regex patterns were created to extract typical
linguistic constructs around image and video content, such
as debunking reports, claims of being real or attribution to
a third party source such as a news provider.
Our approach is semi-automated, using a list of a priori



















Table 1: Run description and results.
Learning Precision Recall F-score
RUN-1 ARM (TB,UB) 0.981 0.851 0.912
RUN-2 ARM (TB+FOR,UB) 0.771 0.906 0.833
RUN-3 ARM (TB,UB) and ATT (pr.) 0.988 0.887 0.935
RUN-4 ARM (TB,UB) and ATT (ret.) 0.980 0.874 0.924
RUN-5 TB,UB,FOR 0.587 0.995 0.739
entity list automatically using information theoretic weight-
ings (i.e., TF-IDF) or create a list manually (i.e., using a
journalist’s trusted source list). All news providers have long
lists of trusted sources for different regions around the world
so this information is readily available. For this task we cre-
ated a list of candidate named entities by first running the
regex patterns on the dataset. We then manually checked
each entity via Google search (e.g., looking at Twitter pro-
file pages) to determine if they were obvious news providers
or journalists.
We assign a confidence value to each matched pattern
based on its source trustworthiness level. Evidence from
trusted authors is more trusted than evidence attributed
to other authors, which is more trusted than unattributed
evidence. In a cross-check step we choose the most trustwor-
thy claims to use for each image URI. If there is evidence
for both a fake and genuine claim with an equal confidence
we assume it is fake (i.e., any doubt = fake). Our approach
provides a very high precision, low recall output.
3. SUBMITTED RUNS AND RESULTS
We submitted five runs that explore different combina-
tions of features (TB, UB, FOR) and methods (ARM, ATT). Table
1 shows the specific run configurations and performance.
In RUN-1 and RUN-2, we apply the ARM in which we build
CL1 and CL2 (Figure 1) by using the sets of features spec-
ified in Table 1. For example, in RUN-2, we use the con-
catenation of TB + FOR for CL1 and UB for CL2. RUN-3 is
a combination of ARM and ATT methods, in which we con-
sider for each post the result of ATT as correct if available,
otherwise we use the output of ARM. Similarly, in RUN-4, we
consider the results of ATT as samples for retraining (step (b)
in Figure 1) along with the agreed ones of ARM. All models
built in ARM use a Random Forest WEKA implementation
[5]. Finally, RUN-5 is a plain classification method that is
built with the whole amount of available features. In terms
of performance (F-score is the evaluation metric of the task),
RUN-3 achieved the best score when using the combination
of the two methods. Apparently, as shown from the RUN-
1, RUN-2, the presence of FOR features reduced the system’s
performance. By observing the RUN-3 and RUN-4, one may
notice the considerable performance benefit is derived from
the combined use of ARM and ATT.
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